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Equal Justice: Comment on Michael 
Blake’s Immigration and Political 
Equality 
LORI WATSON* 
What does justice require in regards to immigration policy?  This 
question presses upon us—citizens of developed, Western democracies—
with a profound degree of moral urgency.  The number of people seeking to 
immigrate into the world’s liberal democracies is only likely to increase 
in the foreseeable future; immigration due to the impact of global warming, 
armed conflict, and food shortages—just to name a few precipitous causes— 
is expected to increase dramatically in the next generation.1  Add to this 
the fact that those groups most disadvantaged by global inequality—
women in particular—tend to bear the impact of such causes to a greater 
degree than their male counterparts, and the urgency of developing a fair 
policy on immigration is all the more clear. 
Those fortunate enough to be born into a liberal democracy inherit a 
position of global first-class citizen with its accompanying rights and 
privileges denied to the lion’s share of the world’s population.  These 
respective statuses appear, to many, to come down to simple luck.  
Liberalism’s emphasis on the moral equality of all persons, combined with 
its antipathy towards bare moral luck as a fair index of life’s prospects, 
suggests that the prima facie liberal position on immigration ought to be 
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 1. For a discussion of the impact of climate change on migration patterns, see OLI 
BROWN, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, IOM MIGRATION RESEARCH SERIES NO. 31, MIGRATION 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 11–29 (2008), http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1674? 
entryId=16561. 
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a policy of open borders.2  However, some argue that this prima facie 
case can be overridden by other important liberal values—namely, rights 
to self-determination, including cultural self-determination.3  Thus, proponents 
of open borders often begin with the normative claim that all persons 
have equal moral worth while opponents of open borders object that, 
despite our equal moral standing as human beings, we do not have equal 
political standing in every political community. 
Blake’s argument here tries to forge a middle path between arguments 
for open borders on the one hand and closed borders on the other.4  
Blake weaves a middle path through these two opposing starting points 
by noting that although immigrants do not have equal political standing 
with citizens within the country of intended migration, they nevertheless 
do stand in a political relationship vis-à-vis the citizens in the state of 
destination.  In applying for admission, prospective immigrants place 
themselves under the coercive power of the state.  It follows from this 
fact that immigrants are entitled to some form of equal treatment.  Equal 
treatment in the context of adjudication over immigration applications 
requires the state of destination to justify immigration decisions on the 
basis of reasons that such persons could not reasonably reject.5  This 
normative principle imposes a duty upon the state of destination to treat 
prospective immigrants as equal to each other, and so prohibits arbitrary 
exclusion.  The moral equality of prospective immigrants entails political 
rights of nondiscrimination as grounds for admission.  This conclusion 
preserves the egalitarian liberal principle of universal moral equality among 
persons, but nonetheless denies that prospective immigrants possess the 
full panoply of political rights that attach to the status as a citizen within 
a given nation-state. 
Blake argues that to meet the normative requirement, we must offer 
reasons to others they could not reasonably reject; our principles for 
exclusion must meet the following criterion: The facts or features of 
persons to which the state of destination appeals as grounds for exclusion 
must be “factually valid.”6  Blake offers two potential categories of 
consideration in adjudicating applications of immigration: the likelihood 
 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 
49 REV. OF POL. 251, 251 (1987). 
 3. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM 
AND EQUALITY 61–62 (1983). 
 4. Blake brackets claims by refugees and other groups that may have an independent 
moral right to immigrate.  He wants to consider simply whether a policy of restriction 
can be reconciled with the moral equality of all persons.  I follow him in considering only the 
case of those would-be immigrants who have no prior and independent moral claim. 
 5. See T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 5, 168–69, 189 (1998). 
 6. Michael Blake, Immigration and Political Equality, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 963, 
976 (2008). 
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for “economic success” and potential “political integration.”  In this way, he 
ties together justificatory reasons with empirical validity: “[T]he reasons 
we cannot reasonably reject have this character, in part, because of their 
empirical plausibility.”7  Thus, “[the state] may differentiate between 
persons only when sufficient evidence exists to motivate the distinction; 
evidence, that is, that the reasonable agent could be expected to interpret 
as factually sufficient to justify a difference in political treatment.”8 
There are two steps to Blake’s argument, and I will consider each in 
turn.  The first step requires acknowledging that it is not a violation of 
moral equality to have different political rights attached to membership 
in a particular political society.  For example, the United States would 
violate the equality of its citizens by denying some portion of them the right 
to political participation, assuming they are similarly situated to those who 
receive such rights.  However, there is no affront to equality when the 
United States denies citizens of Canada the right to vote in U.S. elections. 
Membership in a political community entails formal political equality, at 
least, for all members, but denying such formal political equality to 
nonmembers is consistent with respecting them as moral equals.  As it 
stands, this argument is convincing.  However, it does rest upon the 
assumption that nation-states themselves, as they currently exist, are 
legitimate in some sense.  Blake’s claim, that we must offer reasons to others 
that they could not reasonably reject as grounds for immigration policy, 
would seem to include the requirement that we justify nation-states as 
legitimate entities for enacting such policies in the first place.  There 
may indeed be sufficient reasons for doing so.  Nation-states may be 
the best institutions through which to administer and realize justice.9  For 
Blake to fully defend his position, some defense of nation-states is 
necessary.  Of course, his aims in this paper are far more modest, so this 
does not amount to a criticism of the argument as it stands.  Nonetheless, 
such a defense is necessary for the cogency of his overall argument. 
The second step of Blake’s argument defends the claim that reasons 
for exclusion—to meet the reasonable rejection standard—must rely on 
factually valid claims about persons or groups of persons to be excluded.  
 
 7. Id. at 976–77. 
 8. Id. at 977. 
 9. Although each of these authors arrives at this conclusion via very different 
considerations, see DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 6, 11 (1999), and Thomas 
Christiano, Immigration, Political Community, and Cosmopolitanism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 933, 934 (2008). 
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The purpose of this condition is to prevent pernicious prejudices masked 
as neutral principles as grounds for exclusion.  Preventing invidious 
discrimination is paramount to respecting the moral equality of all persons.  
In his defense of the factual-validity requirement, Blake rests his argument 
on the familiar model of equality that is central to liberal political philosophy 
and originates in Aristotle—namely, equality demands treating likes 
alike and unlikes unalike.  Thus, to justify a difference in treatment among 
persons, we must provide a ground of difference that provides a relevant 
basis for the differential treatment.  Thus, any difference in treatment 
is justified only insofar as that difference is grounded in a reasonable, 
nonarbitrary difference between the two persons or class of persons being 
treated differently; in Blake’s words, the difference must be empirically 
grounded. 
The problem with this approach to equality, particularly as it requires 
us to rely on “factually valid” claims of difference among prospective 
immigrants, is that the “facts” of persons’ abilities, skills, affinities to 
democracy, and so on, are often themselves produced in a context of 
inequality and injustice.  Thus, the facts in question are not produced in 
morally neutral circumstances; they are produced in a world rife with 
inequality.  In this way, relying on empirically accurate facts does not 
remove the potential for discrimination and the reproduction of injustice. 
To see this, consider the following: Women make up two-thirds of the 
world’s illiterates, a consequence of structural gender inequality the globe 
over.10  Thus, it is empirically true that on the whole, women are less 
educated than men.  In the context of making a determination to admit a 
prospective immigrant over another based on the factual determination of 
their educational ability as related to economic success, men will fare 
better than women.  The factual validity of any given man’s higher educational 
attainment is a fact that is made possible under conditions of inequality 
and injustice.  Such facts are not only produced in contexts of severe or 
gross injustice.  It is well documented that men are overrepresented in 
fields related to science, math, and technology even in Western democracies.  
It is also well known that persons with such skill sets are highly desirable as 
migrant workers and as prospective immigrants. Thus, in using a seemingly 
neutral and true fact, we may not discriminate formally at the level of 
law, but we reproduce the background inequalities that produce such 
 
 10. See UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, GENDER PARITY IN EDUCATION: NOT 
THERE YET 4 (2008), http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/EducGeneral/UISFactsheet_ 
2008_No%201_EN.pdf. 
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disparities through the law.11  Thus, these apparently neutral and “fair” 
principles in fact deny substantive, material equality. 
To further develop the criticism I make here, let us consider an 
exemplary use of this approach to equality in U.S. constitutional law.  In 
Reed v. Reed, the Court applied the standard “rational relation test” that 
forms the basis of the factual validity requirement in the equal protection 
doctrine.12  Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows.  The adoptive parents 
of Richard Reed, a minor who died without a will, each separately filed 
a petition with Ada County, Idaho, to be appointed administrator of the 
son’s estate.  The probate court appointed the father, Cecil Reed, as the 
administrator and, as justification, it cited an Idaho statute that stated, 
“Of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males 
must be preferred to females . . . .”13 
The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the probate court’s decision that, given the 
statutory preference for males, Cecil Reed should be appointed administrator 
of the estate instead of Sally Reed, the deceased’s mother.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned that ruling, holding that “a difference in the sex 
of competing applicants for letters of administration” does not bear a 
“rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced” 
by the statute.14 
The objective of § 15–312 clearly is to establish degrees of entitlement of 
various classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of 
relationship to the intestate.  Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of 
the enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated with respect to that 
objective.  By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus 
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.15 
Where the probate court is faced with two persons equally entitled to 
administer the estate in question, a hearing must be held on the merits of 
each person’s ability to administer the estate.  The statute in question 
sought to settle the entitlement issue on the basis of gender, in part it 
 
 11. This model of equality—equal treatment demands same treatment for those 
who are similarly situated—is the model of equality that forms the basis for U.S. equal 
protection doctrine. 
 12. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 13. Id. at 73. 
 14. Id. at 76. 
 15. Id. at 77 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
WATSON.PRINTER.DOC 11/25/2008  2:02:42 PM 
 
986 
seems, on the assumption that men will likely be more qualified than 
women to assume the role of administrator of an estate.16 
What the Court has said, then, is that it is impermissible to use sex as a 
proxy for competency in estate administration because the Court looked 
to the society and found that sex does not bear a fair and substantial 
relation to ability to administer estates.  In other words, some women are 
capable of administering estates and thus a statute that restricts women 
from doing so “by an accident of birth,” as it is commonly put, is thereby 
sex discriminatory.  What is established, then, is that to pass constitutional 
muster, the Idaho legislature must construct “gender neutral” standards 
for estate administration.  Thus, a state may require specific levels of 
education or experience of a relevant kind by persons so long as these 
requirements can be shown to bear a fair and substantial relation to 
ability to administer estates, but what the state may not do is use sex as a 
proxy for education or experience. 
No doubt the outcome of this case seems intuitively fair. Women 
should not be denied the right to administer estates simply because they 
are women.  As Catharine MacKinnon points out, this rationality test 
relies upon what she calls the mirror method: A law that relies upon 
group classification is rational if it can be shown that it accurately 
mirrors society.17  That is, if the classification relied upon by the law can 
be shown to accurately describe the members of the group it aims to 
classify, then the classification can be given a rational basis.  However, 
“the rational relationship test” will only generate an equal outcome given 
the actual “similarly situatedness” of men and women as an input.  In 
other words, it looks to produce equality as an output only when given 
equality as an input, or the supposition of equality as an input.  Were the 
differences between women and men in regards to estate administration 
more real, as they certainly historically have been and as they clearly are 
now, globally—for example, because of insufficient education and 
experience by women in “business affairs”—then the argument that the 
sex-based classification bears a “fair and substantial relation” to the 
purpose of the law in using sex as a proxy for competence in estate 
administration is much more plausible.18 It is important to note that a 
significant degree of actual sex inequality is consistent with this ruling 
and left unaddressed by it. If it turns out that, due to background 
inequalities, the class of men is more or less coextensive with the class 
of competent persons and the class of women is coextensive with the 
class of incompetent persons, an equality rule that says “treat all 
 
 16. Id. at 75–76 (citing Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970)). 
 17. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 220–21 (2d ed. 2007). 
 18. Id. 
WATSON.PRINTER.DOC 11/25/2008  2:02:42 PM 
[VOL. 45:  981, 2008]  Equal Justice 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 987 
similarly situated persons alike” will have nothing to say about that 
degree of sex inequality or the background conditions that produced the 
“difference” between men and women.  Moreover, even if we rule out 
using sex as a proxy for ability—that is, we rule out the use of sex-based 
categories on the face of the law—this is far from sufficient to guarantee 
genuine sex equality.  In the Reed decision, the fact that some women were 
competent to administer estates benefited all women to the extent that 
sex alone was found to be an illegitimate basis upon which to classify 
potential administrators.  However, the real substance of sex inequality 
is that men, judged by neutral standards of education and business 
competence, will nonetheless still benefit in a world in which such 
goods and access to them are distributed on the basis of sex. 
Thus, the incorporation of a factual validity requirement alone is not 
sufficient to rule out the kind of group-based discrimination Blake tries 
to eliminate by this principle.  Two questions arise for us as liberals in 
assessing Blake’s argument.  The first is whether the principle of moral 
justification—reasons that cannot be reasonably rejected—entails only a 
formal model of equality, or in other words, a model that treats likes 
alike and unlikes unalike.  The second is whether we can accept Blake’s 
suggestion that the reasons we cannot reasonably reject are sufficient 
reasons, in part, because of their empirical plausibility while nonetheless 
recognizing that true, empirical generalizations are sometimes the product 
of injustice. 
The answer to the first question is clearly yes. Many liberals and feminist 
liberals, in particular, argue that liberal principles require a substantive 
model of equality.19  As to the second question, I think the answer is yes, 
but it requires us to move away from the standard liberal model of 
discrimination which views social and political distinctions as justified 
insofar as they are rationally justified, where rationally justified entails 
accurately mapping the world.  This model of discrimination rests on the 
thought that political—or legal—classifications of persons are legitimate, 
and hence nondiscriminatory, insofar as they accurately reflect “the 
world out there.”  This model of discrimination is limited insofar as it 
does not ask how the world out there came to be.  Thus, it allows for the 
reproduction of social inequality at the level of legal classification 
 
 19. Martha Nussbaum’s work is essential reading on this point, especially for those 
interested in sex equality.  See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 55–56 
(1999). 
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because it does not critically examine how the facts—in particular, the 
facts of social hierarchy and inequality—came to be.  Thus, rather than 
seeing discrimination solely as arbitrary treatment, we must shift to a 
model of discrimination that recognizes subordination, not simply differential 
treatment, as unequal treatment.  Subordination is understood, in part, as 
having an inferior status.  Social hierarchy and subordination stratify 
individuals as members of groups.  Where a particular woman or female 
child is denied the right to an education, she is so denied because she is a 
member of the group female.  Thus, group-based inequalities that constitute 
the “facts” of individuals’ lives are not morally neutral. 
The emphasis on reasons we could not reasonably reject as the standard 
of moral justification requires us to recognize that such reasons have the 
character they do, in part, because they are reasons we can share—as 
moral equals.  Acknowledging that immigrants stand in a political relationship 
vis-à-vis the state of intended migration requires acknowledging that the 
state is obligated to offer justifications that could not be reasonably 
rejected for its principles.  This, however, also requires acknowledging 
the immigrant as a reason-giver in this context, and as an equal.  The 
normative force of admitting that persons stand in a political relationship 
in the contractarian model is that they stand in an equal, reciprocal 
relationship in terms of the authority of their reasons.  This entails that 
those to whom we offer reasons for the justification of the use of 
collective power can reasonably accept those reasons from a position 
of equality.  It follows from this that principles which depend upon or 
perpetuate the subordinate status of those with whom we are in a 
political relationship are ruled out as just principles.  Further, it follows 
from this that as liberals—committed to finding shared justifications—
we must work to end social inequalities that rest upon social hierarchies 
grounded in group differences.  This commitment is not something that 
is an addition to our commitment to equality; it must form the core of 
our commitment to equality. 
 
